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Case Notes
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT -FEDERAL PREEMPTION
OF STATE LAW-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF NTSB DE-
CISIONS-Federal Law has not Preempted State Law in Actions
Against Air Control Personnel under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and Issues Involved in Such Actions may be Conclusively Estab-
lished by Prior Decisions of the National Transportation Safety
Board. Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
On December 22, 1972, plaintiff, a commercial pilot with instru-
ment rating, made a solo flight in a Bellanca aircraft from Mineral
Wells, Texas to Marion, Indiana, with an intermediate fuel stop at
Flippen, Arkansas. Prior to his departure, plaintiff received a wea-
ther briefing from the Mineral Wells Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) Flight Service Station,' and filed a Visual Flight Rules'
flight plan for the flight to Flippen. At Flippen, plaintiff again ob-
tained weather information from a Flight Service Station and filed
an Instrument Flight Rules3 flight plan for the flight to Marion.
During this segment of the flight, plaintiff maintained radio contact
with various Flight Service Stations en route and received weather
briefings.
As plaintiff neared the end of his trip, he requested and was
granted clearance from the Grissom Air Force Base approach con-
trol' for his landing at Marion. Plaintiff was informed that the con-
troller had no weather data for Marion and was given a summary
of the conditions at Grissom! No information was given plaintiff at
'Flight Service Stations provide, among other things, preflight weather brief-
ings.
' Visual flight rules is abbreviated VFR and is commonly used to refer to flight
in weather conditions that are equal to or greater than the minimum VFR re-
quirements set out at 14 C.F.R. §S 91.105-91.107 (1977).
3 Instrument flight rules is abbreviated IFR and commonly refers to flight in
weather conditions which do not meet the VFR standard. 14 C.F.R. SS 91.115-
91.129 (1977).
4 Brief for Appellant 7 n.7, Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
' Air Force flight controllers are required by Air Force Manual 60-5 to follow
the FAA regulations for air traffic controllers. FAA Handbook 7110.8B S 993
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that time about the existence of icing conditions.! On plaintiff's sec-
ond approach to Marion, the aircraft crashed 500 feet from the
runway. The crash was caused by an accumulation of ice on the
aircraft. The aircraft did not have deicing equipment, and its flight
manual prohibited operation of the aircraft in "known icing condi-
tions."
On August 10, 1973, the FAA suspended plaintiff's airman's
certificate for thirty days. Plaintiff appealed this decision to an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). The NTSB held a hearing on December 11, 1973,
and found that plaintiff was aware of the possibility of icing condi-
tions, and as such had violated FAA regulations by operating the
craft in violation of its flight limitation.! The order reduced the
FAA suspension to fifteen days. Plaintiff appealed this decision to
the NTSB, which affirmed the suspension and later denied a peti-
tion to reconsider its decision. Plaintiff did not seek review of the
decision in the United States Court of Appeals, although he was
entitled to do so;' thus the suspension order became final.
Plaintiff brought an action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming damages for
personal injuries allegedly suffered as a proximate result of the
negligent failure of FAA agents and Air Force personnel to advise
him of icing conditions.' The court determined that the question as
to whether plaintiff had violated FAA regulations had been ad-
versely and conclusively resolved in the administrative hearing."
Since the court held Indiana law to be controlling, plaintiff's con-
requires that an arriving aircraft be provided with information as to cloud ceiling
and visibility at the airport of intended landing if the ceiling is lower than 1,000
feet or the visibility is less than three miles. The current conditions at Marion
Airport were 300 foot ceiling, visibility one mile. Brief for Appellant, supra note
4, at 7. The alleged failure of the controller to provide plaintiff with this informa-
tion thus violated FAA regulations.
I Brief for Appellant supra note 4, at 5.
7 14 C.F.R. § 91.31(a) (1977). The judge also found that plaintiff had vio-
lated section 91.9 by operating the craft in a "careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the property of another." Id.
' 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976) provides for appellate review of administrative
orders.
'Bowen v. United States, No. 75-0009 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1976).
l'Id.
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tributory negligence barred his claim. Plaintiff then appealed this
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Held, affirmed: Federal law has not preempted state law
in actions against air control personnel under the FTCA, and issues
involved in such actions may be conclusively established by prior
decisions of the National Transportation Safety Board. Bowen v.
United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
Two separate and distinct issues were raised on the appeal: whe-
ther federal or state law should govern the issue of negligence, and
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to the opinion
and order of the NTSB to prevent the district court from consider-
ing the issue of plaintiff's negligence. The issues will be considered
separately.
I. APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LAW
A. The Erie Doctrine
In 1842 the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Swift v. Tyson,1 ruling that general federal common law
could be applied in diversity actions commenced in federal court."
In 1938, however, the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins" was de-
cided, overruling Swift, and holding that a federal court sitting in
a diversity case must apply state law." Writing for the majority,
Justice Brandeis reasoned that this doctrine would lead to uniform-
ity between state and federal court decisions and thus discourage
interstate forum-shopping."1 Unfortunately, this result was achieved
at the price of sacrificing consistency among the various federal dis-
trict courts. For this reason, some commentators have criticized the
Erie doctrine as actually encouraging interstate forum-shopping."8
B. Preemption of State Law in Federal Question Cases
The Erie doctrine may have dealt the idea of general federal
common law a serious blow, but the concept nonetheless retained
"141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12id. at 18-19.
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 Id. at 78.
"id. at 74-75.
"See, e.g., Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson, and the True
National Common Law, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 316 (1968).
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some vitality in cases arising under federal question jurisdiction."'
In fact, the Supreme Court applied federal common law in a case
decided on the same day as Erie, in an opinion also authored by
Justice Brandeis. 8 The Court continued to recognize that some is-
sues so directly affected the interests of the United States that fed-
eral common law must be applied rather than state law. 9
In 1943 the Court decided Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,'0 holding that the "rule of Erie . . . does not apply to this
action. The rights and duties of the United States on commercial
paper which it issues are governed by federal law rather than local
law." The case involved the forgery of an endorsement on a check
drawn on the United States Treasurer. The check was endorsed
over to the Clearfield Trust Company, which collected payment
from the United States. The district court, applying Pennsylvania
law, held that a three year delay by the United States in giving
notice of the forgery barred recovery. The Supreme Court reversed,
reasoning that the constitutional function of the federal govern-
ment in paying its debts could not be governed by the "vagaries of
the laws of the several states." Since Congress had not acted in this
area to provide a statutory solution, the Court fashioned a rule of
federal common law to fill the void. The Clearfield Trust rule thus
limited the application of the Erie doctrine to those areas of the
law in which no predominant right or obligation was created in the
federal government by the constitution or by statute.
The Court took another step toward recognizing federal preemp-
tion of state law in 1947 with its decision in Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp.2' This case indicated that direct congressional or con-
stitutional preemption of state law would not always be necessary
1"See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
'1 Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938). The case involved water rights in an interstate stream.
'In United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), a state at-
tempted to assert its regulatory authority over the power of the federal govern-
ment to set and carry out procurement policies. The Court refused to apply state
law to restrict the exercise of a power expressly granted to the federal govern-
ment by the Constitution. Id. at 182. Thus federal common law still applied when
a constitutional right or obligation was to be defined or applied.
20318 U.S. 363 (1943).
21 Id. at 366.
" Id. at 367.
-3331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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for the application of federal common law, as long as Congress, in
a particular area, had manifested a purpose to supersede the police
powers of the states by a
scheme of federal regulation .. so pervasive as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it....
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal in-
terest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of the state laws on the same subject. '
Such a system of federal regulations was instituted relative to the
aviation industry by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958." Congress
las delegated broad regulatory powers over most significant areas
of aviation, but no statutes or regulations currently govern damage
suits arising from domestic air travel." Traditionally, civil damage
,suits brought in federal court which arise from aviation mishaps
have been held governed by the Erie doctrine."7 Since federal regu-
lation is preeminent in the field of aviation, however, it is not sur-
prising that arguments for the application of a uniform federal law
-in this area have arisen. Most such arguments draw support from
the statement of Justice Jackson in Northwest Airlines v. Minne-
.sota:"
Federal control [of air commerce] is intensive and exclusive. Planes
do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move
only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the
hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate sys-
tem of federal commands. . . . Its privileges, rights, and protec-
tion, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal Govern-
ment alone and not to any state government.29
Although Congress has considered legislation which would con-
-trol civil damage suits arising from aviation activities, no such com-
"Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
25Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
.et seq. (1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
26 Damage suits arising out of international aviation activities are frequently
,controlled by treaty, convention, or protocol. Conklin, Aviation-Doubt in the
Courthouse: Is Federal Law Supreme or Not? 1976 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 476,
-477 [hereinafter cited as Conklin].
27See, e.g., Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1962).
" 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
" Id. at 303.
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prehensive legislative program has been enacted.' In the absence of
Congressional action, some commentators and many litigants have
suggested that courts take the initiative and (following the ration-
ale of Clearfield Trust) formulate and apply rules of federal com-
mon law to civil aviation damage suits.3'
The most important case to date holding that federal law pre-
empts the field of aviation is Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines.' This di-
versity suit involved multiple actions arising out of a mid-air colli-
sion involving a private aircraft and a commercial passenger air-
craft. Two of the defendants in the consolidated action, Allegheny
and the United States, agreed to a settlement formula, and then
sued the remaining defendants for indemnity and contribution.3
The trial judge, despite the diverse citizenship of the parties in-
volved, applied the law of Indiana, the place where the collision oc-
curred. The court of appeals reversed, creating a federal law of
contribution and indemnity. ' The court cited no precedents for its
action but reasoned that the exclusive nature of federal aviation
regulation and the need for consistency of result mandated such
an outcome.' Oddly, the court made no attempt to reconcile its de-
l In 1968 and 1969, Senator Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland proposed such
legislation, concentrating mainly upon the difficult conflict of laws problems which
are prevalent in air crash litigation. See S. 3305, S. 3306, and S. 4089, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968); and S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see generally Tydings,
Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 AM.
U. L. REV. 299 (1969). When Senator Tydings failed to win reelection to the
Senate, however, his statutory scheme died in committee. No other comprehensive
program of aviation legislation has since been considered.
"' See, e.g., Note, The Case For A Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster
Litigation: A Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 231
(1976); Keeffe & DeValerio, Dallas, Dred Scott, and Eyrie Erie, 38 J. AIR L. &
COM. 107 (1972).
The first breakthrough in this area occurred in relation to the question of
federal jurisdiction. In Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal.
1972), the court held that alleged violations of federal safety regulations created
a federal cause of action. Id. at 615. Thus the court had pendant jurisdiction to
hear the case even though the right of the plaintiff to recover might be governed
by state law. Id. at 617. Not all federal courts adopted this approach, however,
and the later case of D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, 12 Av. Cas. 18,282 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rejected it explicitly. Most subsequent discussions of the Gabel rule tend
to limit its application to particular facts before the court in that case. See, e.g.,
Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975).
32 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
11504 F.2d at 402.
34 Id. at 403.
I3 d. at 404.
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cision with the Erie doctrine. One commentator has remarked,
"[t]he decision has little precedence and is best understood from
the standpoint of the problems it solved in that case rather than as
a vanguard for preemption."' Indeed, the Kohr case has stood vir-
tually alone in advocating federal preemption of state aviation law.
A recent district court opinion7 applauded the logic and equity of
the Kohr decision, but confined it to its peculiar facts. 8
More recently, the Supreme Court, in Miree v. DeKalb County, 9
refused to extend the Clearfield Trust rule to a case involving the
breach of an FAA contract concerning the use of land near an air-
port.' Although the Court could have seized the opportunity to hold
that federal law has preempted the field of aviation, it reasoned that
since no substantial rights or duties of the United States were at is-
sue, there was no compelling reason to apply federal common law
over state law."1 While Miree left the Kohr opinion technically in-
tact, it expressed a reluctance to expand the preemption doctrine. '
3 Conklin, supra note 26, at 486, citing Prewitt, Federal Common Law of
Aviation and the Erie Doctrine, 40 J. Am L. & COM. 653 (1974).
37 Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Il. 1977).
11 In Kohr, a mid-air collision formed the basis of the action; the United States
was a party to the litigation pursuant to the FTCA; the litigation had been sub-
ject to the supervision of the Judicial Panel created by the Multidistrict Litigation
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407 et seq. (1976); and the interest of the state where the
collision occurred was slight.
Even though the Smith court professed to approve of the decision in Kohr,
it criticized the failure of the Kohr court to explain or distinguish the Erie doc-
trine. 428 F. Supp. at 1287 n.2.
-433 U.S. 25 (1977).
40433 U.S. at 30; see generally Note, Government Contracts: Third Party
Beneficiaries and the Expanding Body of Federal Common Law, 31 U. MIA. L.
REv. 1493 (1977).
41 433 U.S. at 30-3 1.
'Id. at 31. The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that federal law has
preempted state law in regard to certain aspects of aviation. In City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), Justice Douglas (writing
for a majority of five Justices) affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
striking down a local ordinance which prohibited certain aircraft from taking off
between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The Court held that federal legislation in the area
of noise control (the Noise Control Act of 1972, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b) (1976))
had indicated Congressional intent to create a pervasive scheme of federal regula-
tion leaving no room for state or local supplementation, thus invoking the rule
in Rice, supra note 17. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by three
Justices, argued that there was no express provision in the Noise Control Act of
1972 or in the regulations promulgated thereunder affirmatively preempting local
noise control ordinances.
City of Burbank may be distinguished from both Miree and Kohr in that the
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Against this background, the court in Bowen v. United States
declined to apply the preemption doctrine to create a federal com-
parative negligence standard in aviation damage suits." Writing for
a unanimous three-judge court, Judge Tone pointed out that since
the preemption issue was not before the district court, the appel-
late court did not need to consider that aspect of the plaintiff's ar-
gument." The court proceeded, however, to consider the argument,
and rejected it for two reasons. First, the court distinguished Kohr
on the basis that the Kohr court "did not have before it the ques-
tion of whether the law referred to in the Federal Tort Claims Act,
viz., 'the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,' is
federal or state law."' Moreover, the Bowen court observed that
the Supreme Court, in the leading case of Richards v. United
States," held that the law of the state where the tortious act or
omission occurred must be applied in actions arising under the
FTCA." To bolster his conclusion further, Judge Tone cited a foot-
note to the Miree opinion which indicated that state law still con-
trols in aviation tort claims brought under the FTCA."
former involved a conflict between federal legislation and state action, whereas
the latter two cases sought the application of federal common law to preempt
state common law. City of Burbank does serve to indicate that federal law may,
in an appropriate area, preempt state law where Congress has legislated specifical-
ly in that area.
"3570 F.2d at 1316-1317.
"Plaintiff had failed to raise this issue at trial. 570 F.2d at 1316, citing Youker
v. Gulley, 536 F.2d 184, 186-187 (7th Cir. 1976).
4570 F.2d at 1316. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United
States is liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its employees and agents
in accordance with the law of the place where the tortious act occurred. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b).
Another case arising out of the air crash in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines was
argued January 11, 1978, and is still under advisement at this writing. Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines and the United States, Nos. 76-2289 and 76-2290 (7th Cir.,
argued January 11, 1978).
-369 U.S. 1 (1962).
" Choice of law questions are also to be resolved by resorting to state law.
Id. at 10-15. This is an application of the "renvoi doctrine," providing an excep-
tion to the generally recognized rule that the law of the forum applies in deter-
mining choice of law rules. While this doctrine has largely been repudiated by the
American courts which have considered it (see, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White
Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955)), the Richards case expressly recognizes
it in actions under the FTCA. On the renvoi doctrine, see generally, Cormack,
Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict
of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (1941).
" 570 F.2d at 1316, quoting 433 U.S. 25, 29 n.4 (1977): "There is no indica-
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Instead of relying solely upon the language and judicial inter-
pretation of the FTCA to dispose of the preemption issue, the court
attempted to show that the federal interest involved in Bowen was
insufficient to require application of the Clearfield Trust rule."9 The
court saw no significant conflict between the interest of the federal
government in uniform regulation of aviation and the interest of
the state in which the tortious activity occurred."0 In the absence
of such a conflict, the court was not compelled to extend the pre-
emption doctrine beyond Kohr."
After deciding that state law should control in the damage action
against the government, the court went on to determine in which
state the act or omission occurred. Judge Tone ruled out both the
"place-of-impact" rule and "significant contacts" rule as contrary
to the language of the FTCA." In choosing to apply Indiana law,
the court reasoned that "the acts or omissions in Indiana were not
only the last in time but had a more significant causal relationship
to the injury than those occurring in any other state." 3 The flight
control personnel who were responsible for giving Bowen weather
data on conditions at Marion and permission to land there were lo-
cated in Indiana. Moreover, the crash occurred in that state, and
arguably could have been prevented there. The court supported its
conclusion with the general rule stated in Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws that "the law of the state where the injury oc-
curred will normally be applied, unless some other state has a 'more
significant relationship' to the occurrence and the parties than that
state."'
Having decided that Indiana law should be applied, it remained
for the court to determine the Indiana choice-of-law rule. The dis-
trict court held (erroneously, according to Judge Tone's opinion)
that lex loci delecti was the prevalent rule in Indiana." The error
tion that petitioners' tort claim against the United States will be affected by the
resolution of this issue. Indeed, the Federal Tort Claims Act itself looks to state
law in determining liability."
49 570 F.2d at 1317.
60 Id.
51 id.
51Id. at 1318. See generally Note, Conflict of Laws-Wrongful Death--Sig-
nificant Contacts vs. Lex Loci, 34 J. Am L. & CoM. 114 (1968).
1 d. at 1318.
"Id. at 1318-1319 n.17.
"Id. at 1319.
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was moot, however, in view of the fact that Indiana substantive law
would be applied regardless of the applicable choice-of-law rule.'
II. THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF THE
AGENCY DETERMINATION
Traditionally, most courts have regarded collateral estoppel in-
applicable to administrative determinations." This view was gradu-
ally relaxed toward the middle of the twentieth century," and the
Supreme Court finally abandoned its prior position in United States
v. Utah Construction and Mining Co." In that case, a contractor
was dissatisfied with a decision of the Advisory Board of Contract
Appeals and brought a civil action against the United States. The
Supreme Court held that the administrative board, acting in a judi-
cial capacity, had allowed each party the opportunity to litigate
fully the issues upon which the plaintiff's action depended and that
collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the same issues." The
Court went on to discuss the circumstances under which an ad-
ministrative agency's findings would be binding upon the parties in
a subsequent action at law: "When an administrative agency is act-
ing in a judicial capacity and resolves issues of fact properly before
it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,
the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce re-
pose.
Since the time of the Utah Construction decision, it has become
evident that some administrative decisions can form the basis for
the application of collateral estoppel." Most state courts which
have considered the issue recently have adopted the essential ele-
ments of the Utah Construction rule and will apply collateral estop-
Id.
In an early case on the subject, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally
that "decisions of the executive department . . . cannot constitute res judicata.
." Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 285 (1906). State courts hesitated to
hold otherwise, and federal courts continued to abide by the Supreme Court's
enunciated principle, although commentators such as Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis argued vigorously to the contrary. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 5 172
(1951).
58K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 548 (1958).
"384 U.S. 394 (1966).
"Id. at 422.
"Id.
"K. DAVIS, supra note 58, at 548.
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pel when necessary to achieve a just result."3 Thus it is not surpris-
ing that most of the cases refusing to apply the doctrine involve
situations where justice requires that the parties be afforded the
opportunity to relitigate key issues."4
Collateral estoppel will not operate if the issues, claims, and par-
ties involved in the administrative proceeding differ from those in
the court action. 5 Moreover, there must be a final decision on the
merits, or the issues will be open to relitigation.6 But perhaps the
most difficult question surrounding the application of the Utah
Construction rule has concerned what constitutes "an adequate op-
portunity" to litigate an issue at an administrative hearing. Normal-
ly, if the parties have had one opportunity to litigate an issue fully
and equitably, further consideration of the issue will be precluded. 7
Even this principle, however, is not applied if manifestly unfair, as
in a case where it is unforeseeable that an issue resolved in an ad-
See, e.g., Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
55 Cal.2d 728, 361 P.2d 712, 13 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1961); Evans v. Monaghan,
306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Eflect of
Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. U. L.
REV. 65 (1977).
"For example, where a discharged worker sued his employer under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, alleging that his firing was racially motivated, a National
Labor Relations Board ruling that he was fired for good cause did not collaterally
estop the plaintiff from asserting otherwise. Tipler v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971). The court noted the difference in scope be-
tween the two proceedings, observing that "the Trial Examiner was only investi-
gating a possible violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Consequently, he
did not fully explore the racial aspects of the case .. " Id. at 129.
In some areas, Congress has stipulated by statute that administrative deter-
minations may not estop consideration of an issue in a subsequent proceeding.
See, e.g., Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459 (1968). For ex-
ample, a report of the NTSB is not admissible as evidence in a damage action.
49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1976). In an opinion interpreting this provision, the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia summarized the reason for
this policy:
The rights of parties are to be determined by testimony adduced
at the trial according to the rules of examination and cross-exam-
ination. It is quite clear that [49 U.S.C. § 1441(e)] reveals the in-
tention to preserve the functions of court and jury uninfluenced by
the findings of the Board or investigators.
Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
5 K. DAvis, supra note 58 at 548.
6 Id. at 365.67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
Plaintiff did have the right to judicial review of the NTSB decision. See note 8
supra.
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ministrative proceeding would arise in the context of a later ac-
tion. 8 If a party's failure to litigate more vigorously in the first ac-
tion is attributable to this lack of foreseeability, there is some au-
thority that collateral estoppel should not apply."'
The trend today is markedly in favor of applying collateral es-
toppel to administrative determinations in the absence of compel-
ling evidence that injustice would result. At the core of this trend
is the policy of encouraging final disposition of disputed issues; thus
second chances are not awarded lightly.
Applying these considerations to the facts of Bowen, two ques-
tions were presented to the court. First, did the NTSB hearing es-
tablish that plaintiff was negligent? Second, if so, may that finding
form the basis for collateral estoppel? Affirmative answers to both
questions would require an affirmance of the summary judgment
for defendant granted by the district court.
Judge Tone began his analysis of the first question by noting that
Indiana had incorporated federal air safety regulations by statute.7*
The court then observed that, under Indiana law, negligence is es-
tablished by violation of a safety statute." Thus, Bowen's negli-
gence was conclusively established in the NTSB proceeding, a fact
which would bar his recovery under Indiana law."
The only remaining question before the court was the suitability
of the NTSB decision as a basis for collateral estoppel. Turning
first to the general prerequisites for the application of the doctrine,
the court listed eight requirements: a suit and an adversary pro-
ceeding; a final judgment; a decision on the merits; this decision
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; identity of parties;
identity of subject matter or issues; capacity of parties; and mutu-
ality of estoppel." Aside from the fact that the first decision was by
an agency instead of a court, Judge Tone found all the essential
elements present. 4
e8RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1, comment i (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1976).
"Lewis v. International Business Mach. Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Ore.
1974).
70 IND. CODE 5 8-21-4-8 (1976).
71Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 398, 98 N.E.2d 896, 900 (1951).
"Huey v. Milligan, 242 Ind. 93, 97, 175 N.E.2d 698, 700 (1961).
73 Amann v. Tankersley, 149 Ind. App. 501, 509, 273 N.E.2d 772, 777 (1971).
'4570 F.2d at 1320.
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The court next examined the circumstances under which Indi-
ana applies the doctrine of collateral estoppel to an administrative
determination. Since no Indiana decision could be found which
dealt directly with this question, the court chose
the rule that appears best to effectuate the policies that underlie
the rule. Here the underlying policy, viz., that one fair opportunity
to litigate an issue is enough, is best served by the rule that issue
preclusion applies to a final administrative determination of an
issue properly before an agency acting in a judicial capacity when
both parties were aware of the possible significance of the issue in
later proceedings and were afforded a fair opportunity to litigate
the issue and obtain judicial review."5
The court first noted that the NTSB had acted in a judicial ca-
pacity in its hearing." Next, the court responded to Bowen's con-
tention that the difference between the evidentiary rules of the
NTSB and federal courts required religitation of the negligence
issue in the interest of fairness. While conceding that hearsay evi-
dence was admitted and that plaintiff's opportunity for discovery
was limited in the agency hearing," the court was unable to agree
that these factors precluded a "full and fair opportunity in the ad-
ministrative proceeding to litigate the fact issues that were con-
trolling in both proceedings.""
Bowen next argued that since reports of the NTSB are not to be
considered in a subsequent suit for damages, collateral estoppel
cannot be based upon the NTSB determination." The court an-
swered this contention by refusing to equate a "report" in 49 U.S.C.
section 1441 (e) with an order pursuant to 49 U.S.C. section
1429, ° holding that section 1441 (e) is inapplicable to license sus-
pension appeals.'
Finally, the court considered Bowen's argument that he would
have litigated more fully and forcefully in the administrative hear-
73Id. at 1322.
7 Id.
" These practices are proper in a hearing before the NTSB. See 49 C.F.R.
S 821 (1977).
78 570 F.2d at 1322.
7°49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1976); see note 64 supra.
" 49 U.S.C. § 1429 provides for the suspension of a pilot's license by the
NTSB.
s' 570 F.2d at 1320 n.23.
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ing had he foreseen that he would be bound by that determination
in a later proceeding.82 If this were the case, it would be unfair to
preclude a reexamination of the factual issues tending to establish
his negligence. Noting that Bowen had retained counsel and vigor-
ously contested the suspension of his license, the court dismissed
this contention, and affirmed the action of the district court."
Ill. CONCLUSION
The opinion of the court in Bowen is significant. It confirms,
along with Miree," that the doctrine of federal preemption of avia-
tion law is still of limited application, and that there is little or no
movement among courts to extend it. This extension appears even
less likely in cases which arise under the FTCA in light of the long-
standing interpretation of that statute as referring courts to state
law only. The most that can be said at present is that courts will
extend the federal preemption doctrine only when a serious conflict
between federal and state law arises, and then only if there is a sub-
stantial federal interest in the uniformity of the law on the issue in
question.
The collateral estoppel issue was a more difficult one in Bowen,
and a slight alteration of the facts could have resulted in a different
decision. Had it appeared that Bowen actually had considered the
NTSB proceeding as unimportant, the court might have allowed
him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. Moreover, if Bowen
could have demonstrated to the court that the procedural rules of
the NTSB denied him an opportunity to establish that he did not
violate the FAA regulations in question, the court would have been
hard pressed to deny him another chance to demonstrate that he
was free from negligence. The only principle which can be stated
with certainty on this aspect of the case is that the decisions of the
NTSB will be used as a basis for collateral estoppel in a subsequent
damage action unless the plaintiff can prove to the satisfaction
82 This argument was based largely on Lewis v. International Business Ma-
chines. See note 69 supra.
8 The facts in Lewis are somewhat parallel to those in Bowen on this point.
As such, it is entirely conceivable that if Bowen actually had been less than ener-
getic in contesting the license suspension, the case might well have come within
the Lewis exception to the Utah Construction rule. Moreover, Bowen might well
have preferred to accept the license suspension through a plea of nolo contendere
and thus avoid the use of collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation.
"See note 39 supra.
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of the court that he was denied an opportunity to present his side
of the issue. How difficult this will be to prove will become appar-
ent only as future cases are decided. At the present, however, ad-
verse determinations by the NTSB are likely to present litigants
with an obstacle which, if not insurmountable, is nonetheless for-
midable.
Peter E. Graves
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN
ADMIRALTY-Strict Liability in Tort Applies in Products Liability
Suits in Admiralty and the Principles of Comparative Fault Apply
in Such Actions. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction
& Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
In 1969 the fishing vessel Enterprise, owned by Pan-Alaska Fish-
eries, Inc., caught fire and ultimately sank while on its maiden voy-
age after being rebuilt. The fire began in the engine room, probably
the result of a malfunction of one or more oil filters installed on the
marine engine. The engine had been manufactured by Caterpillar,
sold by its dealer, N.C. Marine, and installed on the Enterprise by
the rebuilder, Marine Construction & Design Company (Marco).'
Pan-Alaska sought recovery for the loss of the Enterprise in federal
court under the court's' admiralty jurisdiction,' bringing claims in
both strict liability and negligence against Caterpillar, N.C. Ma-
rine, and Marco.' The trial court held strict liability inapplicable
under the facts of the case and found only N.C. Marine liable on
'Caterpillar had discovered that the factory-installed filter could not be safely
used on the D343 marine engine and had mailed a letter to its dealers, including
N.C. Marine, advising that the filter should be replaced with another model. N.C.
Marine delivered a D343 engine for installation in the Enterprise nine days after
the letter was mailed. N.C. Marine had not changed the filter nor did it warn
Marco or Pan-Alaska of any hazards connected with the filters.
'28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
'No negligence claim was brought against Marco. Pan-Alaska also alleged
breach of implied sales warranty against Marco and N.C. Marine and breach
of implied warranty of workmanlike service and breach of contract against Marco.
Brief for Appellant at 6, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction &
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
4
"On this issue of strict products liability, the trial court found that 'under
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the negligence theory. After an additional finding of contributory
negligence by Pan-Alaska and the Enterprise crew, the trial court
rendered a judgment for Pan-Alaska of one-half the cost of the En-
terprise according to the admiralty rule of equally-divided dam-
ages.' On appeal the case was remanded in light of United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co.,' which had adopted a rule of pure compara-
tive fault in maritime law.
On remand, N.C. Marine was held one-third responsible for the
loss of the Enterprise and Pan-Alaska two-thirds responsible.! Pan-
Alaska sought review of the district court's findings on the strict
liability and contributory negligence issues in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Held, vacated and remanded: Strict liability in
tort applies in products liability suits in admiralty and the princi-
ples of comparative fault apply in such actions. Pan-Alaska Fish-
eries Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129
(9th Cir. 1977).
Admiralty: Its Relation to Aviation Tort Law
The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion."' Original jurisdiction of claims under maritime law is vested
in the federal district courts but qualified by the famous "saving to
the particular facts of this case the doctrine of strict liability is not applicable.
Even if the doctrine were applicable, it would not have increased the liability of
N. C. Marine nor would it have made any other defendant liable.'" 565 F.2d
at 1134 (quoting from trial court record at 367).
1 The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). This
landmark case established an American maritime rule of equally-divided dam-
ages in collision cases. The Court based its holding on the well-settled rule in
English admiralty at that time. Despite the fact that comparative fault principles
were later adopted in personal injury cases, equally-divided damages remained
the rule in property damage cases until 1975.
6421 U.S. 397 (1975). Reliable Transfer involved the stranding of a vessel
on a sand bar as a result of negligence by the crew and an inoperative naviga-
tional aid maintained by the Coast Guard. The Court considered only the validity
of the divided damages rule established by The Schooner Catharine, and replaced
that rule by a rule of pure comparative fault in property damage cases. Id. at 411.
'The district court emphasized that it was allocating damages based on culp-
ability, not causation. Had causation been the deciding factor, the court pointed
out, the plaintiff would have collected only $1,000 rather than approximately
$70,000. The damage caused by the engine fire could have been limited to the
$1,000 amount had the plaintiff not been negligent. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v.
Marine Construction & Design Co., 402 F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
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suitors" clause.9 The result has been to grant the federal courts in
admiralty exclusive jurisdiction of maritime in rem actions not
recognized at common law.1" In personam maritime claims may be
brought in either state or federal courts." If a claim is brought be-
fore a federal court sitting in law, rather than in admiralty, some
independent ground of federal jurisdiction must be invoked." In
all cases federal maritime substantive law governs, although state
law may be used to supplement or even occasionally modify the
general maritime law. 3
928 U.S.C. S 1333(1) (1976). That section provides "[tihe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of (1) Any
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." The language has been held
to include statutory modifications of the common law which are not in conflict
with substantive maritime law. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.
109, 124 (1924).
10Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954): The Hine v. Trevor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 570-72 (1866).
1 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. at 123; Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1955).
11 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
13Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). State law was used
to fill the "gaps" in the general maritime law. One glaring gap was in the area of
wrongful death. Admiralty law, like the common law, recognized no action for
wrongful death. The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. SS 761-68 (1976),
provided for wrongful-death actions on the high seas, beyond state territorial
waters, but maritime law provided no remedy when the death occurred in state
waters. Thus the courts "borrowed" state wrongful-death statutes for maritime
deaths in state waters. This often produced incongruous results. Many state
wrongful-death acts treat contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery,
while in maritime personal injury cases rules of comparative fault apply and
contributory negligence only mitigates recovery. Thus a party's negligence would,
be a total bar or only a partial bar depending on whether the injuries proved
fatal. The wrongful-death anomaly was eliminated in 1970 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
This landmark decision discarded 85 years of precedent in overruling The Harris-
burg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), the case which had established that maritime law
provided no cause of action for wrongful death. The unanimous decision found
that an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation
of maritime duties. The Moragne decision has been widely applied since 1970
in both marine and aviation death cases. See Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d
865 (5th Cir. 1970) (aviation death in state waters); Barnette v. Butler Aviation
Int'l, Inc., 89 Misc.2d 350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1977) (death of American service-
man in crash of military aircraft in Vietnam); Neal v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (death of serviceman in Vietnam).
For further discussion of the role of state courts in maritime law, see gen-
erally Still v. Dixon, 337 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Craig & Alex-
ander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty: Problems of Federalism,
Tempests and Teapots, 37 J. Am L. & COM. 3, 19-24 (1971); and Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 196 (1971).
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With the advent of air travel in the early part of the twentieth
century there was a considerable body of opinion that the "ocean"
of air, and hence all air flight, should fall under admiralty jurisdic-
tion. 4 The theory never received general acceptance, and from the
beginning Congress and the courts generally emphasized the differ-
ences between aircraft flight and maritime activities." Admiralty
jurisdiction, nevertheless, has been held applicable to airplanes in
certain circumstances.
The first major inroad came in the extension of admiralty juris-
diction to land-based aircraft in wrongful-death actions arising
from aircraft crashes at sea. In 1920 Congress passed the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA) ," creating a statutory action for mari-
time wrongful death. The wording of DOHSA was broad and made
no specific reference to surface vessels." The first aviation case
brought under DOHSA was Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co.,"
where death was caused by the crash of a seaplane on a trans-Pa-
cific flight. The court held that DOHSA was applicable in such a
case.1" Since Choy, although actions under DOHSA have been
4 Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 85, 91 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
1954).
1 "T]he navigation and shipping laws of the United States, including any
definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and including the rules for the pre-
vention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply to seaplanes or other air-
craft or to the navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes or other aircraft."
49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1976). Aircraft are generally not considered "vessels" in
maritime law. The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269, 271 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
Aircraft crewmen are not considered "seamen." Hubschman v. Antilles Air-
boats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 848-52 (D.V.I. 1977). Airplanes are not subject
to maritime rules regarding burden of proof. Georger v. United States, 1949
U.S. Av. Rep. 113, 115 (E.D. Va. 1949). Aircraft owners cannot limit their
liability for crashes at sea as marine vessel owners can. Hubschman v. Antilles
Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. at 845-46; Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29
F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
1a 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976). DOHSA was passed to fill the void in maritime
law demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision in The Harrisburg. See note
13 supra.
17 "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from a shore of
any State ...the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the ex-
cluive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative
against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued." Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
18 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
18 "The Federal courts took jurisdiction of such cases because the literal pro-
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held cognizable only in admiralty,"0 many actions for wrongful
death have been brought under DOHSA for aircraft crashes into
the high seas.2 ' Today it is considered settled that this specific sta-
tute gives federal admiralty courts jurisdiction of such wrongful-
death actions."
Once the right of action under DOHSA was established, the
courts began to expand admiralty jurisdiction over aircraft torts. In
D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.," the court upheld
a claim under DOHSA although there was no aircraft crash and the
death occurred on land. The occurrence of the tortious act over
the high seas was held sufficient to bring the claim within admiralty
jurisdiction. ' A few courts then took the next step and allowed ac-
tions for personal injuries occurring on or over the high seas in
aircraft.' Personal injury actions clearly do not arise under
DOHSA, and the courts sought to justify the decision by relying
visions of that statute appeared to be clearly applicable." Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 262 (1972).
20 Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 686 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); see Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleve-
land, 409 U.S. 249, 271 n.20 (1972). Contra, Choy v. Pan-American Airways
Co., 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
" Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 838 (1958); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955),
dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956), Lavello v. Danko, 175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951);
Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 966, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420,
423, afl'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, afl'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d
785 (1944).
22 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 263-64.
- 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
'In D'Aleman, a passenger on a flight from Puerto Rico to New York went
into shock when the pilot was forced to feather one of the engines and make
an unscheduled landing. He died four days later in New York. In upholding a
claim under DOHSA the court said,
The law would indeed be static if a passenger on a ship were pro-
tected by the Act and another passenger in the identical location
three thousand feet above in a plane were not. Nor should the
plane have to crash into the sea to bring the death within the Act
any more than a ship should have to sink as a prerequisite.
Id. at 495.
1 Horton v. J & J Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (personal
injuries caused by plane crash in Atlantic); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (personal injuries suffered when air-
plane jolted violently in the air on trans-Atlantic flight); Bergeron v. Aero Asso-
ciates, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963) (personal injuries in helicopter
crash near drilling rig).
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on D'Aleman and an expanded view of admiralty jurisdiction gen-
erally. " Another court, in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,"
invoked admiralty jurisdiction for an airplane crash occurring
within one marine league of shore. 8 A few other courts followed
the Weinstein court's lead into general maritime law." These seem-
ingly small steps were in fact giant leaps. The courts had progressed
far beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the literal wording of the
Death on the High Seas Act and placed aviation torts within ad-
miralty jurisdiction based solely on the locality of the tort.
Finally, in 1972 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
the application of federal admiralty jurisdiction to aviation tort
claims. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland' involved
a jet aircraft which struck a flock of seagulls on takeoff and crashed
into Lake Erie a short distance from the airport. The Supreme
Court denied that admiralty jurisdiction applied in such a case and
established two requirements for an aviation tort to fall within ad-
miralty jurisdiction. First, the wrong must occur over navigable
waters;" and second, there must be a significant relationship to tra-
ditional maritime activity.2 ' The Court was not prepared to say that
" In Notarian, the court emphasized that the decisive factor in D'Aleman
was the occurrence of the cause of action in a maritime environment. The method
of travel into the area should not be determinative. The court then proceeded to
employ a new and expanded definition of maritime jurisdiction: "Generally ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction extends to all things done upon and relating
to the sea and waters navigable therefrom, to transactions relating to commerce
and navigation, to damages for injury upon the sea, and to all maritime con-
tracts, torts and injuries. I Am. Jur., Admiralty, § 9, pg. 550." Notarian v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, at 877 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
'7316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
28 DOHSA provides only for claims for deaths occurring outside one marine
league (approximately three miles).
"Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970). The case is sig-
nificant because it applies the judicially-created maritime wrongful-death action
from Moragne (see note 13 supra) to airplane crashes within state waters. See
also Harris v. United Air Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431, 432 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
"409 U.S. 249 (1972).
21 Id. at 268. This is the traditional test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. Id. at
253. See also Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971); Thomas
v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No. 13,902) (C.C. Me. 1813). In the case of air-
craft, the place of injury has been held to be the place of the wrong. Thus, negli-
gent repairs on land which result in injuries over the water could invoke tort
jurisdiction. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 85, 92 (N.D. Cal.
1954); Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D. Mass.
1951).
U 409 U.S. at 268.
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no aviation torts could meet these requirements. In fact, it indicated
that an aircraft on a transoceanic flight might bear a significant re-
lationship to traditional maritime activity because it would be per-
forming a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels.'
Similarly, light aircraft spotting schools of fish might meet the re-
quirements?
While ostensibly the Executive Jet decision narrowed the cov-
erage of admiralty jurisdiction by establishing the two-pronged test
and specifically excluding aviation tort claims arising from flights
by land-based aircraft between points within the continental United
States, its effect was to broaden the scope of coverage by giving
official sanction to aviation tort claims under general maritime law.
Death actions can now be brought, once the two-pronged test is
met, under either the Death on the High Seas Act or the general
maritime death action as interpreted by the Moragne decision.'
Personal injury claims on aircraft are cognizable in admiralty once
the maritime locality and nexus requirements are met."6 Even prop-
erty damage suits involving aviation torts have been tried in ad-
miralty."7 The question of just how far the courts will extend mari-
time law into aviation remains unanswered, but the courts have had
little difficulty finding a relation to traditional maritime activity in
most flights over open water. It seems Executive Jet only succeeded
in excluding from admiralty jurisdiction the occasional airplane
crash into an inland lake or river, while bringing a wide range of
other claims into maritime law.3
Strict Products Liability in Admiralty
Throughout the evolution of products liability law the admiralty
3Id. at 271.
4 Id. at 271 n.22. This is the fact situation in Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431
F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
1 See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 830 (1977); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Renner v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 403 F. Supp. 849
(C.D. Cal. 1975). See also note 13 supra.
- See Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977);
Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
" See T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
38 For a discussion of what constitutes a sufficient relationship to traditional
maritime activity to support federal jurisdiction in aviation tort cases, see Annot.,
30 A.L.R. Fed. 759 (1976).
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courts generally remained aloof, taking no part in its development.
Federal maritime law is derived primarily from statutes and his-
torical admiralty principles, as interpreted by the federal courts.
The law, however, remains flexible, adapting by judicial decision to
changing social and economic patterns. Thus, when a rule of law
is "so widely accepted as to be construed as a part of the general
law of torts,"" it may be incorporated into admiralty if harmonious
with the rest of admiralty law."' Often this incorporation proceeds
slowly with the admiralty courts waiting until the rule of law is ac-
cepted by a clear majority of state supreme courts.4 1 It was not until
1945, almost thirty years after MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,"
that products liability based on negligence was incorporated into
maritime law in Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.'
The development of products liability posed special problems
in admiralty. During the years following the MacPherson decision
the courts at law sought ways to impose liability on a seller or
manufacturer in the absence of negligence." Numerous ingenious
devices were found to support strict liability. Among the most pop-
ular was the device of a warranty running with the product from
manufacturer to consumer, analogous to a covenant running with
the land.' Although essentially a tort concept, this warranty car-
ried so many contractual connotations that the courts faced nu-
39 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1945), afl'd, 328
U.S. 85 (1946).
'Id.; accord Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631,
636 (8th Cir. 1972); Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp.
935, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
41 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D. Del. 1962).
-217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Prior to 1916, the general view of
the law had been that the original seller of goods was not liable for damages
caused by their defects to anyone except his immediate buyer. Judge Cardozo's
opinion in MacPherson established a negligence theory of products liability which
found immediate acceptance in courts at law.
149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), afl'd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). This was an action
for personal injuries by a longshoreman injured when the shackle supporting a
boom broke during loading operations. Drawing strong parallels to MacPherson,
the court concluded that although the shackle was supplied by a component
manufacturer, the manufacturer of the boom assembly had negligently failed
to inspect that part.
"The early cases dealt with strict liability for food and drink, a special re-
sponsibility at common law. See R. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND THE
FOOD CoNSUMER 26 (1951); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 653 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
"Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
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merous problems.' These problems, coupled with severe criticism
of the warranty concept," led to the emergence of a products liabil-
ity action free from contract implications-strict liability in tort.'8
In 1965 the American Law Institute adopted a new section, 402A,
in the Second Restatement of Torts which discarded the term war-
ranty as the basis of liability.' This strict liability concept experi-
enced explosive development and rapid acceptance by the state
courts,"' and the old notion of implied warranty fell into disfavor.'
46 Contract defenses, such as disclaimer, failure to notify of breach, and lack
of privity, were particularly frustrating to courts anxious to impose liability on the
manufacturer for injury to the consumer. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 44 (Alas. 1976); In Re Alamo Chem. Transp. Co., 320
F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
47 All this is pernicious and unnecessary. No one doubts that, unless
there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in
contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract
law of sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and twist-
ing" that "warranty" can be made to serve the purpose at all.
Why talk of it? If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be
strict liability in tort, declared outright, without any illusory con-
tract mask.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
48 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), was the landmark case discarding the warranty theory
and adopting strict liability in tort. See also PROSSER, supra note 44, at 656-58.
49 402A: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965).
50 By 1971 two-thirds of the state courts accepted and applied strict liability
in tort. PROSSER, supra note 44 at 658. See Note, 44 J. AiR L. & CoM. 207, 208
n.5 (1978).
" Implied warranty remains as an alternative basis of liability. The extension
by some states of the seller's warranty to all persons who may foreseeably be
expected to be injured and the adoption by other states of provisions that liability
cannot be disclaimed have made warranty a more attractive alternative action.
Id. at 658.
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The original warranty concept was particularly unfortunate in
admiralty. For a contract to be maritime and thus fall within ad-
miralty jurisdiction, it must depend on, assist, or further transporta-
tion on navigable waters." Neither the place where the contract is
made nor the place of performance is conclusive in determining its
maritime nature. The warranty as articulated by the courts in the
strict liability actions was simply not a maritime contract. The con-
tractual implications of the implied warranty led some courts to
hold that admiralty jurisdiction was improper for such actions."
Most courts nevertheless recognized the implied warranty as a
tort action and the theory gained limited recognition in admiralty.
The first admiralty case to impose strict liability successfully, in
the form of implied warranty, against a manufacturer was Middlle-
ton v. United Aircraft Corp.," in which the pilot of a helicopter was
killed when his aircraft crashed into the Gulf of Mexico. The ac-
tion was brought by the decedent's representative under the Death
on the High Seas Act for breach of an implied warranty. The court
concluded that breach of an implied warranty was included in the
DOHSA phrase "wrongful act, neglect or default. ' Noting that
privity was not a requirement for recovery in negligence cases or
implied warranty cases involving food, the court took "one logical
step forward" and held that recovery against a manufacturer on a
breach of warranty theory without a privity requirement was ap-
propriate in the case before it."
The Middlleton case received little attention at the time, but was
criticized two years later in the next major case, Noel v. United Air-
craft Corp." The Noel case, like Middlleton, involved as action
52 Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); The Steamer Eclipse
Braithwaite, 135 U.S. 599 (1890); Grant v. Poillon, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 162
(1857).
"Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 940 (1963). For a discusion of the tort-contract jurisdictional delinea-
tion in admiralty see In Re Alamo Chem. Transp. Co., 320 F. Supp 631, 635-38
(S.D. Tex. 1970).
54204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
5546 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). See note 17 supra.
56 Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856, 859 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). It should be noted that the Middlleton court recognized the implied war-
ranty as a pure tort action.
" "While the decision, being in admiralty, is entitled to respect, the failure of
the Court to recognize and dispose of a number of valid arguments against the
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under DOHSA for a death in a plane crash on the high seas. Noel,
however, involved an additional complication-the decedent was
a passenger on a commercial air carrier. In refusing to recognize
a cause of action in admiralty against a parts manufacturer based
on breach of an implied warranty of fitness, the court pointed out
that in admiralty law the right of injured passengers to recovery has
historically been limited to negligence theories."8 The court con-
cluded that the rule of implied warranty was neither so widely ac-
cepted as to be a part of the general law of torts nor was it har-
monious with the existing admiralty law."
For the next few years the federal district courts in admiralty
faced a series of cases brought under breach of implied warranty,
with some courts following Noel" and others following Middlie-
ton.' In 1965 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals imposed liabil-
ity in admiralty on the basis of implied warranty but made no refer-
ence to maritime law or admiralty jurisdiction in the matter."5 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1968 affirmed a lower court
holding that the doctrine of implied warranty was applicable in
admiralty. The court, in a case involving a helicopter crash in the
Gulf of Mexico, justified its decision on the basis of wide accept-
result there reached detracts from its weight." 204 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D. Del.
1962).
58 Id. at 934.
51 Id. at 939. In addition to holding that negligence was the traditional theory
for recovery for passengers on common carriers, the court seemed concerned
that strict liability would be used to circumvent the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention which limits liability of air carriers but provides no protection to
manufacturers. Id. at 940. It was also unclear that an airplane passenger fell
within the protected class defined by early warranty cases, or that the implied
warranty would be compatible with the already existing strict liability doctrine
of unseaworthiness which provided protection to seamen. Id.
"o Jennings v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 227 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1964)
(death in a blimp crash).
,1 Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), a0f'd, sub norn, Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968) (death in a blimp crash); In Re
Marine Sulphur Transp. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) afl'd, 460 F.2d
89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (shipbuilder in wrongful death
case); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (in-
jury suit by member of Navy against a component part manufacturer, bypassing
immune government manufacturer).
", McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965).
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ance of implied warranty in air disasters occurring over land." In
1969 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized implied war-
ranty actions in Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co.," a
case which also involved a contributorily negligent plaintiff.
The movement in admiralty from strict liability actions under
implied warranty to actions under Section 402A began in 1969."
Then in 1972, in Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp.,"
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate
court to incorporate strict liability as expressed in Section 402A
into federal maritime law stating that "the doctrine of strict liability
in tort has been accepted and adopted by a sufficient number of
states so that it is now . . . a part of tort case law that should be
embraced by federal maritime law. This also fulfills one of the pri-
mary goals of maritime law, uniformity.""' The court further ex-
plained that Section 402A "is the best expression of the doctrine as
it is generally applied.""
The Lindsay case concerned the crash of a U.S. Navy jet during
a training mission over the Gulf of Mexico. Although no wreck-
age was recovered, the court indicated that if it could be established
that the plane was on fire prior to the crash, then that evidence
might be used to infer the existence of a defect. The plaintiff was
not required to prove a specific defect." This could be significant
IKrause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constr. Aeronautiques, 301
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969).
"416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969).
"' Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969). Lanson
Soileau was killed when a crane manufactured by the defendant toppled from
its base and fell into the Gulf of Mexico. The court determined that the manu-
facturer would be liable to Soileau's widow and children under both Louisiana's
wrongful-death statute and the Death on the High Seas Act. In the course of this
determination the court adopted the cause of action framed by section 402A
as "a uniform statement of the rule [of strict liability] now so generally accepted
in the States as to permit it to be incorporated into federal maritime law." Id.
at 127.
-460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972).
"7Id. at 637.
"Id. at 636.
69 "Here we do not think it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a spe-
cific defect. . . . [A] fire would strongly indicate a malfunction in the aircraft
itself resulting from some defect in either manufacture, material, or design." Id.
at 637. Note that on remand to the district court the fact-finder determined that
the airplane was not on fire when it hit the water and concluded that the plaintiff
had not established the existence of a defect. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Air-
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in admiralty actions where an aircraft or vessel is lost as a result
of the accident and the plaintiff has no concrete evidence to bring
to trial.0
Although other courts have followed the Lindsay court in apply-
ing strict liability in admiralty cases,7' the issue is by no means set-
tled. Twice the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has reserved the
question.' By late 1977 only four federal appellate courts had in-
corporated either implied warranty or strict liability in tort into
maritime law."
The Pan-Alaska Case
Against this background of uncertainty as to the position of strict
liability in admiralty, the Ninth Circuit made its decision in Pan-
Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co." There
was no uncertainty in the court's decision, however: "We hold that
strict products liability actions have become sufficiently well-estab-
lished to justify being incorporated into the law of admiralty.""n In
justifying its decision the court quoted extensively from Lindsay,
but made no mention of Noel v. United Aircraft Corp. or the ob-
jections to strict liability voiced in that case." Like the Lindsay
craft Corp., 352 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1972), afl'd, 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir.
1973).
70 See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 830 (1977), for an interesting discussion of causation, circumstantial
evidence, and the relation of strict liability to res ipsa loquitur in such cases.
7'Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1976); Heiman
v. Boatel Co., Inc., [1976] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 5 7570 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd
sub nom., Heiman v. Medlin Marine, Inc., 534 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1976); Streatch
v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
1 2Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 426 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Williams v. Brasea, 497 F.2d 67, 78 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 846
(D.V.I. 1977). The reservation by the Fifth Circuit Court is particularly signifi-
cant as the Fifth Circuit encompasses the Gulf Coast states where a large number
of admiralty claims arise.
"The Courts of Appeals of the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits had in-
corporated implied warranty actions. Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co.,
416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969); Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de
Constr. Aeronautiques, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming a lower court
incorporation); McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965). Only
the Eighth Circuit had adopted strict liability in tort as defined by Section 402A.
Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972).
-4565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 1134.
76See note 59 supra, and accompanying text.
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court, the Pan-Alaska court also adopted Section 402A as the best
and most widely accepted expression of the theory of strict productsliability."
The early part of the opinion reads like many other products li-
ability cases-holding the manufacturer, dealer, and retailer all
subject to liability because they are integral parts of the producing
and marketing enterprise. It also reiterated the principle that a
manufacturer cannot delegate his duty to have his products deliv-
ered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects. 8 Had
the Pan-Alaska court stopped at this point the decision would still
have been significant because of the further recognition of strict
liability in admiralty. The court, however, chose to confront an ad-
ditional issue, the allocation or apportionment of the liability
among "strictly liable" defendants and a contributorily negligent
plaintiff." Despite the proliferation of defendants and defenses the
court felt that traditional maritime law, in the guise of comparative
fault, offered a simple solution.8"
Although admiralty has been a follower in the field of products
liability, it has always been a leader in the area of comparative
fault. While the courts at law grappled with the inequities of con-
tributory negligence, inventing makeshift defenses, admiralty rou-
tinely applied some form of division of liability." At a time when
77 565 F.2d at 1135.
78 1d. at 1136.
79Id.
"When the court concluded that strict liability applied, the following situation
existed: Caterpillar and Marco were held strictly liable; N.C. Marine was held
strictly liable and negligent; and Pan-Alaska was held negligent prior to the voy-
age and was held vicariously liable for the negligence of the crew both before
and after the fire (see note 92 infra). Thus the allocation of liability, normally
a relatively simple task, became a complex problem. The problem can become
even more complex when questions of indemnity and contribution are included.
See George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative Negli-
gence: The Mult-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1976).
81 Admiralty law derived by descent from the civil law and most civil law
jurisdictions quite uniformly apportion damages. In contrast, the common law
courts, until recently, have been extremely unwilling to permit any division, citing
as reasons the indivisibility of a single injury, the lack of definite bases for appor-
tionment, and bias or unreliability of the jury called on to make the division. Ad-
herence to tradition and reluctance to adopt new concepts with new problems no
doubt also played a part. Yet increasing dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing
concepts of negligence, its defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, and doctrines such as the last clear chance eventually led to the acceptance
of comparative fault principles. Beginning in 1910 with Mississippi, a few states
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contributory negligence would have been a complete bar to recov-
ery in civil actions, maritime law followed a rule of equally-divided
damages in collision cases.8" This rule gave way to comparative
fault in property damage cases in 1975 in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co.' A rule of comparative fault also has long been ap-
plied in personal injury actions in admiralty."
In light of admiralty's heritage in comparative fault it is not sur-
prising that the Pan-Alaska court should apply those same princi-
ples with respect to strict liability actions. The numerous criticisms
directed at the merger of the two doctrines were summarily dis-
missed. The primary criticism currently being advanced by judges
and legal scholars is that no valid comparison can be made between
the plaintiff's negligent conduct and the strict liability of the manu-
facturer.' This criticism seems to have its origins in the early strict
liability cases based heavily on public policy considerations, cases
which characterized the manufacturer as an insurer of his product
against defects. Several courts have adopted this reasoning and re-
fused to apply comparative fault principles in strict liability cases. '
adopted comparative negligence statutes: Wisconsin and Nebraska in 1913; South
Dakota in 1941; Arkansas in 1957; Maine in 1964. Then in the late 1960's the
concept gained popularity, and by the end of 1977 more than thirty states had
adopted comparative negligence in one form or another. Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170 (1978); Feinberg, The Applica-
bility of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit
Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, 42 INS. CoJNs. J. 39, 44
(1975). Where admiralty has traditionally used pure comparative fault, many
states have preferred to retain some vestiges of the old common law concepts by
completely barring recovery when the plaintiff's fault exceeds some designated
amount (49% or 50% of the total fault, or "slight" as opposed to defendant's
"gross" negligence). For more detailed discussion of the history of comparative
fault see PROSSER, supra note 44, at 43-45.
"The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855);
see Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 603 (1963).
- 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
"See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953). See also
Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. S 766 (1976).
" "[T]he focus is upon the nature of the product, and the consumer's reason-
able expectations with regard to that product, rather than on the conduct of either
the manufacturer or of the person injured. . . ." Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
575 P.2d 1162, 1179, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 403 (1978) (dissenting opinion of J.
Mosk).
86Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976); Kirkland
v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974); Kinard v. Coats
Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976).
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A current trend, however, reflected in the decision of the Pan-
Alaska court, considers strict liability to have at least some ele-
ments of fault. 7 The focus is on the manufacturer's conduct in put-
ting the product on the market." "[W]e feel that a common de-
nominator has been reached [through applying the term 'compara-
tive fault' to encompass all the parties' conduct] to compare the
"7 "Fault" in this context should not be equated with negligence. As Judge
Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit said,
Delicts (torts) do not have to depend on negligence. In the Civil
Code, as in the common law, there are a number of instances of
strict delictual liability when the law conclusively presumes fault
notwithstanding the fact that the party liable did not will the dam-
age and was not personally negligent.
Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1963).
See also Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969). The
public policy justifications for strict liability voiced in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and count-
less other cases have tended to draw attention away from the manufacturer's con-
duct and focus solely on the existence of a defect. The exact nature of the cause
of action created by Section 402A was of little practical importance until the
arrival of comparative fault. Then the courts were forced to decide whether
Section 402A creates a cause of action for an implied warranty divested of the
contractual problems of notice, privity, and disclaimer, or whether it creates, in
essence, a cause of action for negligence divested of the scienter requirement and
of the plaintiff's burden of proving the specific negligent acts of the manufacturer.
The former theory focuses on the defective nature of the product while the latter
focuses on the manufacturer's conduct. Feinberg, The Applicability of a Com-
parative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d, 42 INS. COUNS. J. 39, 39-44 (1975). The
courts adopting the implied warranty concept, with its emphasis on the defect,
have had difficulty reconciling the 402A action with comparative fault. Kinard
v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974). See also Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1179, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 402 (1978) (dissenting opinion
of J. Mosk). In contrast, courts viewing Section 402A as a fault-based action, or
as a type of negligence per se, have readily embraced comparative fault. Here the
blameworthy conduct of both plaintiff and defendant can be easily compared.
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On-Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Thus it is reasonable to expect
that the growing popularity of comparative fault will foster a corresponding
growth in the acceptance of Section 402A actions as fault-based. It should be
pointed out that another approach has been taken to find a common ground for
comparison in strict liability-comparative fault cases---comparative causation.
Comparative causation may prove to be the most practical and workable solution
to the comparison dilemma. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. 1977); Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among
Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974); see also
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976).8 Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602
(D. Idaho 1976). See note 87 supra.
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manufacturer's conduct in manufacturing and selling a defective
product and the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct which is a con-
tributing cause to his own injuries."" The court, in reaching its de-
cision, also seemed to give some weight to the fact that admiralty
courts had been applying comparative fault principles in actions
based in unseaworthiness, a form of strict liability, for some years
with little difficulty."
The next major problem confronting the court was to decide
what conduct of the parties should be compared in determining li-
ability. The court rejected a wide array of possible defenses which
ranged from the emergency doctrine to the "thin-skulled plaintiff"
rule and decided that all the plaintiff's negligent conduct should be
considered in assessing the defendant's liability.9 At the trial in the
district court it had been determined that Pan-Alaska and the crew
of the Enterprise were negligent in several respects, both before and
during the fire." Appellant, Pan-Alaska, sought to distinguish be-
tween the negligence which went to the cause of the fire and that
which went to the aggravation of damage once the fire began, say-
ing that only that conduct which contributed to the cause of the fire
811565 F.2d at 1139.
"Id. at 1138.
"' Although these defenses were argued and briefed extensively by both par-
ties, the court did not address them specifically but simply held that all the plain-
tiff's conduct should be considered. Id. at 1139.
"The trial court found the Enterprise crew and Pan-Alaska negligent for the
following reasons:
(1) The engineer was negligent in leaving the engine room before
operating the engine at full-speed-ahead without observing the en-
gine and the filters operate under the higher fuel pressures generated
under those conditions.
(2) The engineer was particularly negligent in not observing the
engine under full load conditions when he knew or should have
known that the fuel supply was contaminated.
(3) The crew was negligent in failing to find out that a switch
outside the engine room controlled the blower which was forcing
air into the engine room.
(4) The crew was negligent in not stuffing the air ducts to stop
the engine and stop the flow of air into the fire.
(5) The crew was negligent in not cutting the wires leading to the
blower.
(6) Pan-Alaska was negligent in not equipping the Enterprise with
a means of shutting off the engine from outside the engine room.
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could properly be called contributory negligence." The court re-
jected this distinction, saying, "[W]e hold that all of plaintiff's con-
duct contributing to the cause of his loss or injury can be compared
to the defendant's liability regardless of the labels attached to that
conduct."" The Pan-Alaska court even includes failure to discover
the defect as negligence which could be usedto mitigate damages.
Assumption of risk would apparently also serve only to mitigate
damages and would not be a complete bar to recovery.
At the close of the opinion the court summarized its holdings on
defenses to strict liability, reiterating the equitable principles which
have been the hallmark of comparative fault in admiralty:
[W]e find that any label ... which either allows plaintiff to recov-
er full damages, even though he was partially at fault, or which
totally bars his recovery, even though the defendant was partially
at fault, is not consistent with comparative fault principles and is
therefore rejected ....
Such "all-or-nothing" defenses are inequitable in their operation
because they fail to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault
and place upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which
two are, by hypothesis, responsible. If, for example, the user's
conduct in failing to discover or guard against the product's defect
is highly irresponsible and the product's defect slight, it offends
our sense of justice and fair play to impose the whole loss on the
manufacturer in the name of imposing the burden of defective
products on manufacturers as one of the costs of doing business.
There is no reason why other consumers and society in general
should bear that portion of the burden attributable to the plain-
tiff's own blameworthy conduct."
Pan-Alaska and the Future
The Pan-Alaska case marks the coming of age of strict liability
in admiralty. The unequivocal, even eager, acceptance of the doc-
trine by the court should have immediate effects on the acceptance
'Reply Brief for Appellant at 12-18, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
94 1d. at 1139. Admittedly the statement is somewhat ambiguous because of
the term "contributing to the cause of his loss." This could mean conduct con-
tributing to the cause of the fire, in which case that conduct which aggravated
the damages would be excluded. It is clear, however, in light of the briefs and
the remainder of the opinion that the court meant all conduct contributing to the
loss.
'3565 F.2d at 1139-40.
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of strict liability by other admiralty courts." Unfortunately, the
court did not deal with the questions raised in the Noel decision."
Whether a court will allow strict liability to be used to bypass the
Warsaw Convention limitations of liability in the crash of an air
carrier is still undecided. In Reed v. Wiser ' the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to allow circumvention of the Convention
by a suit against airline corporate officials. Although a manufactur-
er can clearly be distinguished from a corporate officer, the under-
lying principles are the same. In both cases a plaintiff would be un-
dermining the purposes of the Convention. It has been suggested
that manufacturers should be afforded the same protection under
the treaty that airlines enjoy, and that a system of comparative fault
should be incorporated into the Warsaw Convention." Under the
present system, however, the incorporation of strict liability into
admiralty might encourage litigation against aircraft manufactur-
ers.
The comparative fault decisions in the Pan-Alaska case should
have even greater effects in the future. The courts at law have con-
tinually looked to the maritime law for guidance in the area of
comparative fault, and no doubt they will give some attention to
the decisions made in this case. Yet perhaps the court here, in its
adoption of this purest form of "comparative fault," which essen-
tially compares all blameworthy conduct of plaintiff and defendant,
has taken a simplistic approach to the problem. The appellate
courts have often said that the "problem [of applying comparative
"It is interesting to note that the strict liability issue was only one of many
issues briefed by the parties. The district court's statement regarding the strict
liability question seemed to indicate rejection of the action under the facts of the
case rather than as a legal theory in admiralty: "Under the particular facts of this
case the doctrine of strict liability is not applicable." Id. at 1134. Also, the addi-
tion of Caterpillar and Marco as strictly liable defendants would make little
practical difference in the case as an earlier court decision had already ruled
that Caterpillar and Marco were entitled to indemnity from N.C. Marine based
on contract and Washington indemnity law. Brief of Defendant on Remand,
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., No. 369-72C2
(W.D. Wash., filed July 20, 1978). The conclusion must be that the court saw
its opportunity to make a statement of the law and took it.
" See note 59 supra, and accompanying text.
98 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
91 Hearings on Aviation Protocols Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977) (statement of William F. Kennedy).
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fault principles to strict liability] is more apparent than real."'"
Yet these courts seldom define a common element for comparison,
such as fault or cause, to be employed by the trial court in its de-
terminations. The California Supreme Court attempted at least to
provide some guidance in this area, but it still left it to the lower
courts to provide a "case-by-case evolution of the principles" which
they espoused.' °' Had the Pan-Alaska court provided explicit guid-
ance in the application of the new principles adopted in the case,
perhaps the lower court on remand could have successfully applied
them.1
0 °
The Pan-Alaska court's determination that all conduct should
be considered in comparative fault should provide some simplifica-
tion of the doctrine. Out go all the labels, fancy defenses, and doc-
trines. It remains only for the factfinder to weigh all of the conduct
of the plaintiff and the defendant and then determine liability. In
practice this is probably what happens anyway, with a judge seizing
on legal concepts to explain his decision and a jury reaching the
same result with less finesse.
There is little doubt that the principles adopted by the Pan-
Alaska court provide an equitable solution to the strict liability-
comparative fault dilemma. Other appellate courts are already ar-
riving at similar solutions. The future of these rules, however, re-
mains in the hands of the trial courts where all legal principles must
ultimately prove their worth.
Jean Bishop
100 Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alas.
1976); see also, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (1978).
101 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 575 P.2d at 1175.
102 The Pan-Alaska case is a striking example of the problems involved in a
strict liability-comparative fault case. On remand Judge Solomon looked at the
parties with all their "faults" (see notes 80 and 92 supra) and fell back on the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Reliable Transfer: "[L]iability for
such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault
or when it is not possible to fairly measure the comparative degree of their fault."
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975). Judge Solomon
allocated the damages 50% to the plaintiff and 50% to the three defendants,
knowing that N.C. Marine would have to indemnify both Caterpillar and Marco.
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., No. 369-72C2
(W.D. Wash., filed July 20, 1978). Amazingly enough, this returned the parties to
their original position prior to the last two appeals.
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WARSAW CONVENTION-INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
-Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention Creates an Independent
Cause of Action for Wrongful Death. Benjamins v. British Euro-
pean Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47
U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1979) (No. 78-129).
On June 18, 1972, Hilde Benjamins was a passenger on a British
European Airways (BEA) flight from London to Brussels that
stalled shortly after takeoff and crashed into a field, killing all 112
passengers. Hilde Benjamins and her husband, the plaintiff in this
action, were both Dutch citizens permanently residing in Califor-
nia. Her ticket which had been purchased in Los Angeles clearly
provided for "international transportation" within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention; therefore the international
Convention was applicable to the incident.
Plaintiff brought suit for wrongful death and baggage loss in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against BEA
and Hawker Siddeley Aviation, the designer and manufacturer of
the aircraft. Both defendants were British corporations with their
principal places of business in the United Kingdom. Benjamins
pleaded two bases of federal jurisdiction, claiming a violation of
the Alien Tort Claims Act2 and claiming a federal question "arising
under" a treaty of the United States.' The defendants were alleged
to be liable under Article 17 and Article 18(1) of the Warsaw
Convention,' but District Judge Weinstein dismissed the complaint
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, done Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as the Convention].
The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transportation . . .by
aircraft for hire" defined as any transportation "in which .. . the place of de-
parture and the place of destination . . . are situated . . .within the territories of
two ... Contracting Parties .... .. Convention, art. 1.
2 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 1350 (1976).
328 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
'Article 17 of the Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18(1) provides: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This dismissal was based on
Second Circuit precedent that the Warsaw Convention does not
create a cause of action, but only establishes conditions for a cause
of action created by domestic law. The suit, therefore, was held
not to "arise" under a treaty of the United States.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Alien Tort Claims Act provided no basis for jurisdiction because
the complaint did not allege a violation of the law of nations or any
treaty of the United States.' The court did, however, consider the
question of whether the Warsaw Convention itself creates a cause
of action to be ripe for reexamination. Held, reversed, and remand-
ed: Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention creates an independent
cause of action for wrongful death. Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3482 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1979) (No. 78-129).
In 1929, the nations involved in the then infant international air
transport industry perceived a need to establish a regime of law to
increase stability and uniformity. From a diplomatic conference in
Warsaw, Poland, emerged a convention, the purpose of which was
"to limit international air carriers' potential liability and to facili-
tate recovery by injured passengers."' The Convention became ef-
fective in 1933 and the United States became a High Contracting
Party in 1934.
There is persuasive evidence from the 1929 Warsaw Conference,
and in the flood of writing surrounding the Convention, that the
the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage
or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place
during the transportation by air."
' Judge Weinstein cited Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702
(S.O.N.Y. 1972) afl'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); Komlos v. Compagnie Na-
tionale Air France, 11l F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954); and Noel v.
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957).
1 Judge Lumbard, writing for the Second Circuit panel, reasoned that the War-
saw Convenlion does not seek to outlaw air accidents but to set forth terms of
recovery of damages; therefore airlines do not "violate" the Convention when
a crash occurs. Only when an airline fails to compensate a victim adjudged to be
an appropriate recipient of damages is there a violation of the treaty. Benjamins
v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978), petition for cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 24, 1978) (No. 78-129).
7Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
see also Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Tnc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
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drafters assumed that the Convention created a private right of ac-
tion against air carriers.! In Article 17, the Convention drafters
used the following language: "[T]he carrier shall be liable for dam-
age sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger.
" ..'" G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., head of the United States delegation
to the 1955 conference to amend the Convention," concluded that
"the evidence is over-whelming that the conference reaffirmed the
theory throughout that the convention would establish a system of
liability complete in itself."'" In 1952, one New York court inter-
preted Article 17 as clearly creating a private cause of action, sug-
gesting that, "if the Convention did not create a cause of action
in Article 17 it is difficult to understand just what Article 17 did
do. '12 This interpretation, however, was made without reference
to an earlier New York case"3 holding that the Convention created
"no new substantive rights.'"
The view that no independent cause of action exists under the
Convention is primarily attributable to two Second Circuit cases
decided in the 1950's,"5 which until Benjamins have generally been
regarded as expressing current United States law."' In Komlos v.
8 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967). "The conclusion that Warsaw created an inde-
pendent self-contained cause of action seemed to follow from the structure of the
Convention." Id. at 517-518.
9Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
10 Conference on Private Air Law, The Hague, September 28, 1955, ICAO
Doc. 7631.
"1 Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pt. 1), 26 J.
Am L. & COM. 217, 227 (1959).
"Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768,
773 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Ist Dept.
1953) (negligence action on the death of an airline passenger). The complaint
was found sufficient to state a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention,
which overrides and supplants any contrary local law.
"aWyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (lst Dept.
1943), afl'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785, - N.Y.S. - (1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 882 (1945).
14 181 Misc. at 966, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
Is Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 819 (1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
. " See Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 41, 74 (1975).
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Compagnie Nationale Air France,' defendant airline in the wrong-
ful death action claimed that the Convention created a cause ot
action based on the contract of carriage and that, consequently,
plaintiff could not bring an action based on domestic tort law. The
district judge in Komlos could have ruled more narrowly that the
Convention's cause of action operates in addition to, not to the ex-
clusion of, claims in tort subject to the Convention limitations. '
Instead, he held that the Convention creates no cause of action at
all.1' This view was affirmed by the appellate court,"' and the deci-
sion was later the basis for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
opinion in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana," a civil action
arising out of a foreign airliner's accident over the high seas.
Both Noel and Komlos relied upon a letter written by then Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt in 1934 explain-
ing the effect of the Warsaw Convention." The Secretary of State
indicated that the effect of Article 17 was to create only a pre-
sumption of liability of the air carrier, leaving it to the domestic
law to provide a right of action.' Secretary Hull's letter was used
to explain the Convention's meaning to the United States Senate
when ratification was considered; therefore the Noel and Komlos
courts assumed that this interpretation expressed Congressional in-
tent. While some scholars insisted that the Noel and Komlos pro-
nouncements were in opposition to the intent of the drafters and
11 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954).
i' Calkins, supra note 11, at 328. See also note 24 infra.
9Komlos v. Air France, lll F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954).
-0209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
2 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957). In reaching its decision that the Convention
did not create a cause of action, the Noel court stated, "[I]n any event we agree
with our prior decision in Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, which
impliedly agreed with Judge Leibell's decision in the district court that the Con-
vention did not create an independent right of action." (Citations omitted). Id.
at 679.
11 Letter to President Roosevelt from Sec. of State Cordell Hull, Mar. 31, 1934,
1934 U.S. Av. Rep. 240.
' a d. at 243. "The effect of article 17 (ch. III) of the Convention is to create
a presumption of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere happening of an
accident occasioning injury or death of a passenger subject to certain defenses
allowed under the Convention to the aerial carrier."
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the spirit and purpose of the Convention," the Second Circuit had
twice denied the existence of an independent cause of action, and
certiorari had been twice denied by the Supreme Court. Thus the
rule in Noel held firm."
Courts outside the Second Circuit have accepted the Noel inter-
pretation, denying that the Convention creates any independent
rights of action against air carriers. In Hepp v. United Airlines,
Inc.," a Colorado court accepted Noel as controlling and denied
that any new rights were created by the Convention. The Ninth
Circuit also accepted the Noel rule in Maugnie v. Compagnie Na-
tionale Air France." In construing whether "disembarking" as used
in Article 17 encompassed injuries sustained in a corridor between
the air carrier's gate and the main terminal, the Ninth Circuit noted
24"T-he Warsaw Convention established, whether one might wish it or not,
the rule of contractual liability of the carrier . . . " Georgiades, Quelques Re-
flexions sur L'Aflrtement des Aeronefs et le Projet de Convention de Tokyo, 2
REVUE FRANgAISE DE Daorr AERIEN (1959), quoted in Calkins, supra note 11,
at 217.Calkins, in criticizing Judge Leibell's holding that the Convention creates no
cause of action said:
1. The discussion of Judge Leibell in the Komlos case regarding the
Warsaw Convention was largely unnecessary to its disposition, since
the Convention does not preclude an action founded on the wrong-
ful death act of the place where the accident occurred. 2. The dis-
cussion of Judge Leibell, referred to above, is not supported by the
legislative history of the Convention, and is contrary to its basic
philosophy, which is to impose the liability rules set out therein as
terms of specific contracts of carriage.
Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pt. 2), 26 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 323, 342 (1959).
"In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251-1252
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), a passenger brought an action against a foreign air carrier to
recover for bodily injury and mental anguish allegedly caused by the hijacking
of one of defendant's airplanes. The court held that mental injuries were com-
prehended by article 17 and should be compensable if the otherwise applicable
substantive law provides an appropriate cause of action. While acknowledging
that an independent cause of action under the Convention might serve the Con-
vention's purpose to facilitate recovery, the Court followed the Noel and Komlos
proposition that no cause of action is created by the Convention.
See also Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines, 307 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), a wrongful death action stemming from a fatal airplane crash in Japan.
Plaintiff attempted to remove the case to federal court based on U.S.C. S
1441(b) as a "claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States." The court held that for an action to be removable under 5
1441(b), the treaty must clearly create an actual right in the plaintiff, and no
such right of action was created by the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 900.
" 36 Colo. App. 350, 540 P.2d 1141 (1975).
2 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 934 (1977).
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that the Convention does not create a cause of action, but only a
presumption of liability.
This interpretation was not adopted, however, in Seth v. British
Overseas Airways Corp.," a 1964 First Circuit Court of Appeals
decision allowing an alien to recover from an airline for lost bag-
gage. In Seth the court held that Article 18(1), which echoes the
"shall be liable for damage" language of Article 17, gives an inde-
pendent right of action against the air carrier to a passenger whose
baggage is lost." This conclusion was reached by reference to the
Article 30 (3) phrase, "shall have a right of action"' which indicat-
ed to the court that the Convention created a separate cause of ac-
tion to enforce the carrier's liability for lost baggage."
The case that set the stage for the Second Circuit's reversal of the
Noel pronouncement was Reed v. Wiser," decided about a year
prior to Benjamins. In Reed, the court was faced with the question
of whether the limitation of a carrier's liability in the Convention
was intended to embrace the carrier's employees as well. In con-
cluding that carriers' employees were subject to the liability limi-
tations, the court said that the provisions in the Convention should
be interpreted in a manner that will carry out the framers' intent,
which was to provide uniformity in international aviation liability:
Another fundamental purpose of the signatories to the Warsaw
Convention, which is entitled to great weight in interpreting that
pact, was their desire to establish a uniform body of worldwide
liability rules to govern international aviation which would super-
sede with respect to international flights the scores of differing do-
1 8329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 305. Text of article 18(1) at note 4 supra.
" Article 30(3) provides in part:
As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or consignor shall have
a right of action against the first carrier, and the passenger or con-
signee who is entitled to delivery shall have a right of action against
the last carrier, and further, each may take action against the car-
rier who performed the transportation during which the destruc-
tion, loss, damage, or delay took place.
The court in Husserl, while concluding that there is no cause of action cre-
ated by the Convention, did observe that "it must be noted that Art. 30 does use
the phrase 'shall have a right of action' from which a contrary inference could
be drawn." Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
38555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), noted in
44 J. Am L. & COM. 175 (1978).
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mestic laws, leaving the latter applicable only to the internal flights
of each of the countries involved."
This expressed view of the Convention as a body of uniform avi-
ation law led Judge Lumbard-author of the earlier Noel decision
-to reevaluate the previous cases regarding the existence of a
cause of action founded on the Convention itself. In writing the de-
cision of the court in Benjamins v. BEA, Judge Lumbard placed
primary emphasis on the desirability of a Convention-created uni-
form law governing air crashes. He appeared to be swayed by the
views of Calkins ' that the Convention delegates intended, and took
for granted, that the Convention would supply a cause of action.'
The court proceeded on the assumption that universal applicability
was the goal of the Convention and that it would be "inconsistent
with its spirit""6 to insist that a would-be plaintiff first find an ap-
propriate cause of action in the domestic law of a signatory.
The Benjamins court carried the Seth interpretation of Article
30(3) one step further. While the Seth court decided that the Arti-
cle 30 grant of a "right of action" for lost baggage against the last
of several carriers showed an intention for there to be a similar
right of action where only one carrier was involved,"7 the Benjamins
court expanded this Article 30 analogy to find an independent
wrongful death action under Article 17. The court implies that if
Article 18 creates a cause of action for lost baggage, the similar
wording of Article 17 compels a similar interpretation for a wrong-
ful death action.
The court also cited the British Carriage by Air Act' as evidence
that the source of air carrier liability lies solely in the Convention.
This 1932 British statute clearly substitutes liability under Article
17 for any other statutory or common law liability." Although the
"' Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
" See Calkins, supra note 11.
572 F.2d at 917.
Id. at 918.
1
7 Seth v. BOAC, 329 F.2d 302 (Ist Cir. 1964).
Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1(4) at 440 (1932).
3Id. "Any liability imposed by Article seventeen of the said [Warsaw Con-
vention] on a carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution
for any liability of the carrier in respect of the death of that passenger either
under any statute or at common law .. "
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
amended 1962 Carriage by Air Act omitted reference to this sub-
stitution of liability, there does not appear to have been any change
of the law as to the supremacy of the Convention-created cause of
action. The British statute, however, has also been cited as sup-
port for the opposing view that the Convention was not meant to
create a cause of action. It has been argued that the British statu-
tory creation of an exclusive cause of action demonstrates the ne-
cessity for domestic legislation to supplement the Convention.
While the United Kingdom legislatively declared that the Conven-
tion created new rights of action, the United States merely pro-
claimed the treaty. If the Convention was intended to create its
own rights of action, it is argued, there was no need for the United
Kingdom to make a statutory declaration of this point. 1 Neverthe-
less, the Benjamins court adopted the former interpretation which
looks to the British act as an explanation of the true meaning in-
tended to be given to Article 17.
Procedural advantages available in the federal courts were cited
by the Benjamins court as an additional reason for allowing a direct
cause of action to be brought under the Convention. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation' was created in 1969, and special
procedures such as pre-trial consolidation and assignment to one
expert judge have developed in the federal courts to deal with com-
plex litigation. "3 Therefore, the litigation surrounding air disasters
can best be handled in the federal system, and a plaintiff's access
to the federal courts should not be barred by his failure to estab-
lish a cause of action based on domestic law. The court points out
that allowing plaintiffs to bring a cause of action directly under
the Convention will not greatly increase the volume of federal liti-
gation. Only when plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens and the
United States has treaty jurisdiction will it be necessary to invoke
federal question jurisdiction.'
40 572 F.2d at 919.
4' Comment, Air Passenger Deaths, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 243, 260-61 (1956).
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was created by 28 U.S.C. S
1407 (1976).
'See In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster, New
Hanover, New Hampshire, on October 25, 1968, MDL-DocKET No. 43 (D.C.
New Hampshire 1971), in which all the cases were ordered to be transferred to
New Hampshire for a consolidated trial on liability and remanded to the districts
in which they originated for a determination of damages.
'28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
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In a firm dissent to the majority decision, Judge Van Graafeiland
concluded that there was no need to reconsider the Noel interpre-
tation of the Warsaw Convention. He accused the majority of over-
stepping its powers of review, saying that "the majority no longer
approves of the terms of the Convention and therefore by judicial
fiat has decided to rewrite it."' He accepted the Noel interpretation
of Secretary of State Hull's letter" as expressive of the intended
effect of Article 17: that the Article creates a presumption of li-
ability rather than an independent cause of action. The holding of
the majority, according to Judge Van Graafeiland, was an unau-
thorized expansion of federal jurisdiction over "an entirely new
class of cases which Congress probably never intended should be
there.4
Judge Van Graafeiland believed that another compelling reason
to avoid judicial reinterpretation of Article 17 was the pending
Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention."'
While the Guatemala Protocol has not yet been approved by the
United States Senate, some commentators argue that its revised
language would ensure that a cause of action would be available to
plaintiffs under Article 17." The Protocol changes the language of
Article 17 from "the carrier shall be liable" to the slightly stronger,
"the carrier is liable." In addition, the proposed amended Article
24 indicates the creation of a cause of action, "In the carriage of
passengers . . . any action for damages, however founded, whether
under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of liability
set out in this Convention .... '"" These pending amendments
572 F.2d at 920.
4 See notes 22-23 supra.
47 572 F.2d at 920.
"Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, signed at
Guatemala City March 8, 1971 (reproduced in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 613
(1970)) [hereinafter cited as the Guatemala Protocol].
4 See Boyle, The Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 41, 74 (1975) and Note, The Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw
Convention and the Supplemental Plan under Article 35-A, 5 INT'L L. & POL.
313, 324-25 (1972).
'o Guatemala Protocol, art. IV, amending the Convention, art. 17 5 1.
5 Guatemala Protocol, art. IX, amending the Convention, art. 24 (emphasis
added).
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were further evidence to Judge Van Graafeiland that reinterpreta-
tion of the cause of action question was a policy decision within
the scope of legislative and executive responsibilities, not a ques-
tion for the court."
Even if the dissenting judge had been convinced of the appropri-
ateness of reexamining Noel, he would have reaffirmed that deci-
sion.'" The Convention does not designate who would be the bene-
ficiaries of a wrongful death action, nor does it specify the measure
of damages in such an action." Virtually every wrongful death sta-
tute in the United States and abroad sets out specifically who may
collect damages and what type of damages they may seek;' there-
fore Judge Van Graafeiland would hold that a Convention that
designates neither does not create a cause of action for wrongful
death.
Judge Van Graafeiland makes a convincing structural argument
that it is the sphere of the executive and the legislature, not the
courts, to give new meaning to an international convention. It must
be remembered, however, that two judicial interpretations estab-
lished the notion that a plaintiff could not bring an action directly
under the Convention. The federal courts in the 1950's rejected
the intent of the Convention drafters to provide a uniform source
for causes of action in aircraft accident litigation and followed an
executive's interpretation instead. It seems appropriate, in this peri-
od of increasing international interchange, that a judicial reinter-
pretation should establish a new notion of the desirability of uni-
formity in this type of suit.
Whether other courts will follow the Benjamins majority and
allow plaintiffs to bring actions in the federal courts based solely
on the Warsaw Convention or whether they will consider the ques-
tion a policy decision suitable for legislative action remains to be
seen. If the Guatemala Protocol is adopted by the United States,
discussion will begin anew as to the meaning of the new language
52 572 F.2d at 921.
53 Id.
4 Article 24(2) of the Convention provides, "In the cases covered by Article
17 the provision of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice
to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights."
4See 572 F.2d at 921 n.3.
.[44
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in Articles 17 and 24. Perhaps the changes in the wording of the
Protocol would protide a strong enough inference of an indepen-
dent cause of action to encourage the uniformity in aviation liabil-
ity suits desired by the framers of the Convention in 1929.
Patricia F. Meadows

Current
Literature

